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Terrorist attacks are often justiﬁed by their perpetrators on the basis that victims are complicit in
some policy or action which is worthy of being met with by violence. But how should we view such
arguments from a philosophical perspective? Igor Primoratz writes that while terrorists are likely to
portray their actions as a morally justiﬁed ‘armed struggle’, the indirect contribution of the victims’
acts to the contested policies, insuﬃciently voluntary character of these acts, and the
disproportionate nature of the violence inﬂicted on victims ensures that we can reject these
arguments and legitimately condemn such attacks as ‘terrorism’.
How might one seek to justify morally some act or campaign of terrorism? One might argue that although the direct
victims are ordinary citizens, they aren’t innocent of the wrongs the terrorists are ﬁghting against. Alternatively, one
might concede the innocence of those victims and argue that attacks on them are nevertheless morally justiﬁed,
either by their good consequences on balance, or by some other moral considerations. In this article, I look into the
ﬁrst line of argument.
Terrorism: blaming the victims
Since terrorism is indiscriminate violence against ordinary citizens, arguments challenging their innocence must rely
on some claim of their collective responsibility. Yet many ﬁnd the very idea of collective responsibility an
unacceptable throwback to pre-modern times. Surely moral responsibility essentially belongs to the individual.
However, not all types of collective responsibility are incompatible with the view that responsibility is essentially
individual. We can distinguish between “strong” collective responsibility, which is completely independent of the
choices and actions of individuals, and “weak” collective responsibility, which is ultimately grounded in such choices
and actions. The former is based on certain assumptions about the nature of human groups which cannot be
reduced to that of individuals comprising them. It is said to accrue to individual members of certain groups even
though they may have done nothing to partake in it, and even though their membership in these groups is not a
matter of choice. The latter presupposes no such assumptions. It is basically a type of individual responsibility – it is
generated by the individual’s own choices and actions – which is also collective in that it is bound up with the
individual’s membership in a group.
Strong collective responsibility may seem a good basis for a moral justiﬁcation of terrorism insofar as it provides a
suﬃciently wide reach of such justiﬁcation. If, for example, all Israelis are indeed collectively responsible for the
wrongs the State of Israel has been committing against Palestinians and if those wrongs constitute a just cause for
their armed struggle against Israel, then Palestinian militants can legitimately attack any random collection of Israeli
civilians. Yet one hardly ever comes across attempts at justifying Palestinian terrorism in these terms. This view
says that one can be guilty of a policy one has neither devised, nor implemented, nor supported, and that one can
be a wrongdoer without deliberately doing (or omitting to do) anything in particular. That is, it cannot be stated
without incongruity.
A justiﬁcation of terrorism in terms of complicity of its direct victims can also be based on a weak version of collective
responsibility. One example of such an argument was provided by Osama Bin Laden in an interview in November
2001:
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The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government and that they voted
for their president. Their government makes weapons and provides them to Israel, which they use to
kill Palestinian Muslims. Given that the American Congress is a committee that representsthe people,
the fact that it agrees with the actions of the American government proves that America in its entirety
is responsible for the atrocities that it is committing against Muslims.
The claim is that all Americans (“America in its entirety”) are eligible to be killed: some for devising and implementing
America’s policies, others for voting in elections that decide who will be devising those policies, and still others for
paying taxes that make the implementation of those policies possible.
Another example of this type of argument relates to state terrorism envisaged as a core component of the “war on
terrorism.” In an essay titled “Who May We Bomb?” Barry Buzan, emeritus professor of international relations at the
LSE, deplores the notion that in war, a distinction should be made between a people and its government. A people
can “deserve its government.” When it does, it needn’t be treated diﬀerently than its government. If that government
is the enemy, the civilian population it governs is the enemy too, and may be bombed. Wars are conducted “not just
between groups of ﬁghters, but between groups of ﬁghters and their networks of support.”
How does a civilian population come to deserve its government? The simplest way is by voting for it. Not everyone
takes part in voting, but having the option of voting, even if one makes nouse of it, is enough to become deserving of
whatever the outcome of the voting turns out to be. Therefore civilians in a democracy are legitimate targets. So are
civilians under an authoritarian regime, where the regime has wide support or acquiescence (passive acceptance).
Acquiescence can be coerced, but “such coercion is usually visible, allowing distinctions to be drawn between
passive acceptance and terrorized obedience.” Only civilians living under “blatant tyrannies” are clearly oﬀ the hook.
In general, “the question whether people get the government they deserve can often be answered quite simply on
the basis of day-to-day observations about the relationship between the demos and the government.”
In Buzan’s view, then, whenever civilians participate in the political process by voting, or have the option of doing so
even though they don’t make use of it, or when they support the government, or merely acquiesce in its policies,
they all become legitimate targets of deadly violence, just like their leaders and armed forces. Since that violence
will be deployed with a view to making people change their minds about the kind of government they want to have, it
will qualify as terrorism. Buzan does not call it that, but what his argument seeks to justify is state terrorism as part
and parcel of the “war on terrorism.”
The arguments of Bin Laden and Buzan are meant to show that ordinary citizens are complicit in wrongs that
constitute a just cause for resort to violence, and therefore are not protected against violence; and they deploy the
idea of collective responsibility. However, this isn’t collective responsibility in the strong sense. Ordinary citizens
aren’t said to be complicit in the wrongs at issue simply because of who they are – because of an ascribed, rather
than chosen identity, deﬁned by membership in a certain polity. It is rather collective responsibility in a weak sense:
a type of responsibility that is essentially individual in that it is generated by some action or omission of the
individual, but also collective, in that the individual acts as she does in virtue of her membership in the group, and
that this membership is an indication that she is guilty of such action or omission.
Considerations deployed in these arguments for the claim that the direct victims of terrorism, whether insurgent or
state, are not really innocent, although they are but ordinary citizens, include:
1. That ordinary citizens in some general, unanalysed sense “support” their government and its unjust policies.
2. That failing this they at least acquiesce in those policies.
3. That they have installed their government in power by voting, or could have voted even if they did not.
4. That they pay taxes which the government spends on devising and implementing unjust policies.
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Now, such actions and omissions may well be the ground for moral condemnation of those found guilty of them. Of
course, such condemnation will presuppose harsh moral condemnation of practices or policies involved. Let us
grant, for the sake of argument, that the practices and policies at issue are indeed gravely unjust – unjust to a
degree that can justify resort to violence, when that is the only way of putting an end to them. Then we need to ask
two questions. First, are all those on the receiving end of terrorist violence guilty of such acts or omissions? Is their
group membership a reliable indication that they are? Second, with regard to those who are guilty of those acts or
omissions, is that enough to justify targeting them with such violence?
With regard to most of the acts and omissions listed above, group membership is an unreliable indicator. Being a
citizen of a polity may, but need not involve voting for its government, supporting it in any way, including by paying
taxes, or acquiescing in its policies. A citizen may be completely apolitical. Or she may oppose the government or
the policy at issue and work for a change of policy or even a change of government. Her income may be below the
taxation threshold. Finally, more often than not, a random collection of ordinary citizens is likely to include minors;
and minors, for obvious reasons, can’t be charged with acts or omissions that are at issue here. Thus in almost
every terrorist attack, some of the direct victims may satisfy the terrorists’ criteria of complicity with the wrongs they
ﬁght against, and some may not. A bomb planted in a coﬀee shop or on a city bus, or dropped from a plane on a
city, can’t kill or maim only those ordinary citizens who are complicit in the iniquities of their government, while
staying clear of those who aren’t.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that violence can be employed in a way that harms only those ordinary citizens
who do vote for the government, or support it and its unjust policies in some way, or acquiesce in those policies, or
pay taxes which the government uses for devising and implementing those policies. Is that enough as a moral
justiﬁcation of the violence? Those citizens aren’t innocent in the strongest sense of being completely free of any
wrongdoing. They aren’t innocent in the more down-to-earth sense of having nothing to do with the policies the
terrorist seeks to abolish. On the contrary, they are implicated in them in certain ways.
That may well call for moral criticism, and perhaps some further unfavourable response. But surely they are
innocent in the sense relevant to the issue under discussion: surely there is nothing they have done, or omitted
doing, that makes them deserve, or liable, to be killed or maimed. If at this point the terrorist were to point out that
Smith voted in the last elections, Jones was paying taxes, Black was expressing support for the contested policies
while White was acquiescing in them, and go on to say that that made the lot of them a legitimate target of deadly
violence, that, it seems to me, would be an ineﬀective rebuttal. For it would ignore the drastic disproportion between
their oﬀence and his response to it.
With regard to each of the four types of complicity listed above, we would need to consider just how causally
signiﬁcant it is for the injustice at issue, and just how voluntary it is. Having established that, we would need to ask
whether the nature and degree of wrongdoing and culpability that come to the fore are enough for the persons
concerned to deserve, or become liable, to be targeted by the kind of violence terrorists employ – that is, to be killed
or maimed. To fail to examine every type of complicity in its own right and to continue instead to take any of them as
indication enough of non-innocence and ground enough for liability to be killed or maimed would indicate a
superﬁcial and implausible view of responsibility and liability.
A credible view of these matters is one that grounds a person’s responsibility for some wrongdoing in that person’s
acts or omissions that are signiﬁcantly voluntary, that is, informed and free, and have a suﬃciently strong
connection with that wrongdoing. Further, it provides for a certain morally acceptable proportion between what a
person is responsible for and the unfavourable response to which he is liable on that account.
Of course, a terrorist may also adopt a very diﬀerent view of responsibility and liability: one which does make a
person liable to be blown to pieces if, for instance, that person voted in the last elections (even if her vote was for
the opposition), or if she has been paying taxes (even if there was no way of avoiding paying them), or if she has
voiced support of the government or acquiesced in it (even though her reasons for doing so have nothing to do with
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the policies the terrorist opposes). If the terrorist can’t be persuaded to revise his view of responsibility and liability –
say, by considering whether he would like to see that view applied to his family and friends by some militants with an
agenda he doesn’t share – then there is not much room for further discussion.
The terrorist is likely to insist that his direct victims aren’t innocent of, but rather complicit in, the policies he ﬁghts
against, and that therefore what he does when killing and maiming them isn’t really terrorism, but rather morally
justiﬁed armed struggle. In response, we can point out the problematic, indirect, fractional contribution of the victims’
acts and omissions to the contested policies, the insuﬃciently voluntary character of such acts and omissions, as
well as the drastic disproportion between those acts and omissions and the violence the terrorist inﬂicts on them;
reject his views of responsibility and liability as preposterous; and portray and condemn what he does as terrorism.
A more detailed discussion of the material in this article is available in Terrorism: A Philosophical Investigation
(Polity, 2013).
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